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Introduction 
 
I will have to pass up the opportunity of giving a full explanation and 
exemplification of what small stories are. We, Alexandra Georgakopoulou, 
Luke Moissinac, and I, have done this at several occasions elsewhere 
(Bamberg, 2004a, b, c, d; Georgakopoulou, 2004, 2005a, 2006; Moissinac and 
Bamberg, 2005). Instead, I’d like to take this opportunity to critically take 
stock of biographic-narrative research the way it has emerged in the wake of 
what has commonly been coined “the narrative turn”, and show how it resulted 
in an (often uncritical) celebration of ‘Big Stories’.1 My point in doing this is 
to explicate that all this happened in contrast and at the expense of the 
investigation of everyday small stories. However, the overall aim of this 
contribution to this volume is not to dismiss or do away with ‘Big Stories’, but 
rather open up a route to a deeper reflection of what ‘Big Stories’ are, how they 
operate, and how they can be used in narrative inquiry more empirically and 
productively. Before I start, however, let me briefly describe the position that 
we (Alexandra Georgakopoulou and I) have characterized in the past in broad 
terms as “small stories”: First off, “small stories” are usually very short; and 
that is why we call them “small” (since the term ‘short-stories’ had already 
been coined for a particular literary genre). But more importantly, the term 
“small stories” is meant to refer to stories told in interaction; stories that do not 
necessarily thematize the speaker, definitely not a whole life, but possibly not 
even events that the speaker has lived through – and now, retrospectively, 
reflects upon and recounts (often termed “personal stories” or “narratives of 
personal experience”). Rather, “small stories” are more the kinds of stories we 
tell in everyday settings (not just research or therapeutic interviews). And these 
stories are most often about very mundane things and everyday occurrences, 
often even not particularly interesting or tellable; stories that seem to pop up, 
not necessarily even recognized as stories, and quickly forgotten; nothing 
permanent or of particular importance – so it seems. Thus, it should not come 
as a surprise that these kinds of stories and story-telling activities have been 
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largely neglected in narrative research. However, with this contribution to the 
Huddersfield conference proceedings, we will try to re-establish these “small 
stories” as the bread and butter of narrative studies before narrative researchers 
should turn to the kind of ‘Big Stories’ that have become the privileged topic 
with the turn to narrative over the last 20/30 years. 
 In the following, I will try to account how it was possible that “small 
stories” never really made it to the forefront of narrative research. To 
foreshadow my main argument, I will lay out how it was possible that within 
the turn to narrative ‘Big Stories’, ie. life stories or autobiographies, or at least 
stories of life determining (or threatening) episodes have come to take the 
center stage in narrative studies in the human sciences. ‘Big Stories’ are 
typically stories that are elicited in interview situations, either for the purpose 
to create research data or to do therapy – stories in which speakers are asked to 
retrospect on particular life-determining episodes or on their lives as a whole, 
and tie together events into episodes and episodes into a life story, so that 
something like ‘a life’ can come “to existence”. Situations, I will argue, in 
which ‘Big Stories’ are constructed then are particular kinds of occasions in 
which speakers have been provided with a particular opportunity for reflection 
and a particular type of accounting practice (also often called ‘disclosure’), 
occasions to which the participants have agreed, but occasions that are also 
quite different from situations in which “small stories” are created and shared. 
 To avoid a misunderstanding: I am not out to do away with ‘Big Stories’ or 
the turn to narrative as a whole. Quite the contrary, I regard the move of 
narrative researchers to concern themselves with lives (and narratives as 
reflections of lives) as an important antipositivist move that has enabled 
investigations deeply concerned with how people experience and make sense 
of their experiences and feed these into what they seem to regard as relevant to 
their ‘lives’. Thus, narrative inquiry, in comparison to traditional, positivist 
methods of inquiry, has enabled researchers to take better account of the point 
in time “back then” when the experience happened, and the here and now, 
when the experience is told, where the guiding assumption is that the same 
event “back then” can be made sense of differently at different points in time 
and in different communicative situations. In short, narrative inquiry that uses 
‘Big Stories’ in order to explore lives has moved considerably closer to the 
subjective point of view of the person who actually has lived his/her 
experience. Thus, traditional narrative approaches are more optimally equipped 
to account for people’s actual experiences and people’s interpretations of their 
experiences than traditional positivist approaches. 
 In a similar antipositivist vein, narrative methodology has resulted in 
critical debates and challenges of the status and role of the researcher within 
the data gathering process and the interpretive project as a whole. While some 
narrative approaches work with narrative data from a more detached 
perspective (more about this below), others see the data-gathering process as a 
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co-production of narratives between participant and researcher, and the 
analysis and interpretive procedures as heavily grounded in communally shared 
practices and interpretive repertoires and judgments. Some, particularly 
researchers within the autoethnographic tradition, even go so far as to admit 
and analyze their own biographies and blur the boundaries between biographic 
material that is meant to be “true to life” and ‘autobiographical fiction’. 
Overall, narrative research that has intended to describe and explore people’s 
lives by use of eliciting and analyzing ‘Big Stories’ has contributed 
considerably over the last 30 years to open up the study of  identities in a 
broader and methodologically enriched way. 
 So, one may ask, what then is the problem with ‘Big Stories’ and their 
predominance in the field of narrative inquiry? And while it is clear that there 
is nothing wrong with the study of ‘Big Stories’ in research or therapeutic 
interview settings in a principled way, there nevertheless arise a number of  
issues that, as I will lay out in more detail, block the field of narrative studies 
from taking advantage of the full opportunities that narrative inquiry permits. 
Thus, while it may appear that “small stories” could simply be viewed as the 
everyday practice field for common folks’ capacity to step out of the 
exchanges of small stories and “pull it all together” in the form of a full-blown 
life story (when the occasion is offered), it will be noted that there are very 
different assumptions behind inquiry into “small stories” versus ‘Big Stories’. 
Let me attempt to unpack this in the following. 
 
 
‘Big Stories’ and Narrative Studies as an Antipositivist Stance 
 
The turn to narrative in the human sciences is unthinkable without Jerome 
Bruner’s suggestion to connect self and narrative in innovative ways; at least, I 
would argue, narrative studies nowadays would look rather different if it hadn’t 
been for his repeated efforts to spread ‘narrative’ – first into psychology and 
from there into a larger, cross-disciplinary project. Bruner clearly states that 
“we constantly construct and reconstruct a self to meet the needs of the 
situations we encounter, and we do so with the guidance of our memories of 
the past and our hopes and fears of the future” (Bruner, 2003, p.210), resulting 
in the stories we tell about ourselves, our autobiographies (as well as in the 
stories that are told about us). In order to be able to “furnish” autobiographies 
we rely on a culturally shared symbolic system as well as our personal 
memories2 – memories of the then & there of events that happened in the past, 
as well as the memories of what happened since. In other words, biographies 
are not playbacks of life events but require a point of view from where past 
events are tied together and are made relevant for a here & now – with an eye 
on the biographer’s future orientations. At the same time, Bruner also attributes 
relevance to the situational circumstances of the telling: “our self-making 
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stories need to fit new circumstances, new friends, new enterprises” (p.210). 
He even goes so far to say that “our very memories become victims of our self-
making stories” (ibid). 
 Taking up on these very basic assumptions about the relationship between 
self and narrative, we now have three levels from where value orientations can 
enter life-stories: (i) a general level of culturally shared value assumptions that 
are deeply engrained in the cultural symbolic system that is employed when 
engaging in biographic work; (ii) my visions, hopes and aspirations about what 
I expect my future to be like (which also are culturally constrained, but 
nevertheless very personal and individual); and (iii) the kinds of situative, and 
local interactive forces within which the biographer finds him-/herself – in 
which we have to tailor our biographies toward our audiences. Bruner cogently 
acknowledges that our actual telling of our story always “depends on what we 
think they think we ought to be like”, that this constant caveat does not “end 
when we come to telling ourselves about ourselves” (p.211). Thus, he clearly 
states that there is no single all-purpose story that can speak to all audiences 
simultaneously ‘in one voice’ (p.222). We will return to this point later. 
 Elsewhere, Bruner (2001) addresses the curious ambiguity that we are 
facing when engaging our ‘selves’ and our ‘lives’ simultaneously by way of 
biography. This ambiguity is possibly best characterized as referring to ‘our 
lives’ as what past, present and future orientation “live up to”, so to speak, so 
that a sense of ‘self’ can come to existence. Simultaneously, we are taking an 
already established sense of self for granted in order to be able to collect and 
recollect out of the abundance of potential events those that we consider 
relevant for a past life that in turn enables (and hopefully: makes worthwhile) a 
life now. What looks as a contradiction, namely that the construction of ‘life’ 
requires a self and that the construction of ‘self’ requires a (lived) life, can only 
be bridged, according to Bruner, by a “theory of growth or at least of 
transformation” (Bruner, 2001, pp.27f.) – a transformation by which the 
character can develop from there & then into a new character here & now. And 
simultaneously, the character of the there & then transforms into the speaker 
(in the here & now), who retrospectively, and self-reflectively singles out 
events, sequences them and ties them together into episodes and some form of 
a ‘transformation plot’ that brings out his/her very own perspective on the 
‘lived life’ and ‘present self’. In this sense, there is something that is always 
“built-in” when autobiography takes place, and Bruner calls this “a form of 
‘taking a stand’”, which “is perforce rhetorical” (p.35); and he continues: 
“when one combines the rhetoric of self-justification with the requirement of a 
genre-linked narrative, one begins to come very close to what Goodman 
describes as “worldmaking” in which the constructed Self and its agentive 
powers become, as it were, the gravitational center of the world” (ibid). 
 In sum then, Bruner’s way of opening up the field of narrative studies for 
the study of selves and identities was of utmost relevance for the emerging 
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field of identity research across the human sciences. It helped to explore lives, 
selves, and identities from the perspective of the meaning making subject, 
through the lens of experience – or, at least reported experiences. And although 
the individual is viewed as the agentive subject of his/her lived experience in 
the form of constructing and telling their very own autobiography, this very 
own and very personal autobiography is simultaneously through and through 
social and communal: Not only are our “commitments” to a particular way of 
life always communally shared and aligned with the “commitments” of those 
we live with, they also follow plot constructions that have been formed into 
communal plots which have been told before. This balancing act between the 
two, between making a self that is unique and thus very different from the 
other, and simultaneously ‘just like you’, is what Bruner seems to establish as 
the background against which self “is a product of our telling and not some 
essence to be delved for in the recess of subjectivity” (Bruner,  2003, p.222). 
Of course, this balancing act can result in telling different stories about self at 
different occasions, not only at different times in the course of one’s life, but 
also maybe at the same point in life when confronted with different audiences. 
 This view of self as put together by way of combining an agentive narrator 
with communal (social) forces keeps Bruner clear from the tension that exists 
between two different camps of theorizing narrative – one in which the 
different stories we tell draw on the same core story (Chatman, 1978) versus a 
position that privileges the social context of storytelling (with much less 
emphasis on the story content) (Herrnstein-Smith, 1980). He acknowledges 
many factors to play a role in how the core story will play itself out in actual 
version making, but he states clearly: “My position is that the story is prior to, 
but not independent of, the discourse. We abstract the story from discourse, but 
once abstracted the story serves as a model for future discourse” (Bruner, 1986, 
p.143). So, what we end up with is a certain way of privileging story over 
discourse, that is, moving narrative meaning-making, and thereby narrative 
meaning making as the foundation for self- and worldmaking, into a quasi 
ontological status. One may want to argue that this move was unavoidable, 
particular at the time in the face of positivist advances to meaning, mind, and 
everyday life. At the same time, it is precisely this move that led to a surge of 
inquiries employing ‘Big Stories’ as the paradigmatic cases within a larger 
research project that attempted to get closer to the ‘core story’, the center of 
sense and meaning from where we seem to engage in our everyday, actual 
sense-productions. In sum then, while Bruner’s move to take the essential and 
overpowering agentive self off its throne is clearly recognizable, and although 
it turned out to be overall strategically successful, we nevertheless end up with 
residues of it in the form of an embracement of ‘Big Stories’ as the privileged 
site where selves and identities are already ‘in existence’ before executed in 
actual autobiographies. 
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 A similar orientation as displayed in Bruner’s influence on what became 
the “narrative turn” can be found in Ted Sarbin’s “storied nature of human 
conduct” (Sarbin, 1986), in the writings of Donald Polkinghorne (1987), who 
equally influenced our current theorizing in narrative studies, and in Mark 
Freeman’s work, who has discussed the controversy between ‘Big Stories’ and 
small stories elsewhere (Freeman, in press; see also Bamberg, in press). 
 
 
‘Big Stories’ and Narrative Inquiry 
 
In this section I will try to give a brief account of the different approaches that 
have used ‘Big Stories’ to empirically investigate life stories, autobiographies, 
selves and lives. Again, I will not be able to do justice to all approaches that 
currently are on the market, and I will also not be able to present these 
approaches in their entirety. Rather, my aim is to extrapolate a better 
understanding of what ‘Big Stories’ are, why they seem to be so elucidating, 
and most relevantly, try to expose a number of undercurrents that ultimately 
will lead to our call for investigating small stories as at the very least an 
equally important component within the field of narrative studies. 
 The empirical study of lives by use of the stories people tell (particularly in 
stories about themselves), has a long history in a wide range of disciplines such 
as psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Goodson (2001, p.129) reports 
the origins of life history methods in the form of autobiographies dating back 
to the beginning of the century. Thereafter, life history methods have spread 
from the study of attitudes in social psychology (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918-
1920) to community studies in sociology, particularly within the Chicago 
school, and forty years later back into psychology. Retrospectively, it may be 
argued that the early studies of the members of the Chicago school, particularly 
what became well known under the heading of ‘oral history’ as in the works of 
Studs Terkel, lacked the analytic component of modern day narrative inquiry. 
However, without these origins within the discipline of sociology, Bertaux’s 
(1981) collection Biography and Society, and Plummer’s (1983) Documents of 
Life, and the subsequent foundation of the RC38 in 1984, the Research 
Committee on Biography and Society, within the International Sociological 
Association, would have simply been unthinkable. Let me outline some of the 
methodological principles the way they led early empirical work by Fritz 
Schütze in Germany, and how they were picked up and refined in current 
narrative interview approaches by Wolfram Fischer and Gabriele Rosenthal in 
Germany, and Prue Chamberlayne and Tom Wengraf in the UK. It may be of 
interest to realize that the biographic interview, that is where interviewees are 
asked to tell their life stories, developed originally from more thematically 
oriented interviews. Although these earlier, more thematically oriented 
interviews attempted to focus on the particular question or problem the 
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researcher was interested in within the scheme of what had happened before in 
the life of the interviewee, an explicit interview question that asked for the 
interviewee’s life came as a second step in the development of modern-day 
biographic research. 
 According to Schütze (1984; but see also Kallmeyer and Schütze, 1977), a 
narrator is obliged to follow three basic principles when narrating: (i) 
“Kondensierungszwang”, ie. an obligation to increase the density of a story as 
for instance by not telling ‘everything’ that can be remembered but choosing 
relevant experiences for what is to be narrated; (ii) “Detaillierungszwang”, ie. 
an obligation to give detailed background information about emotional 
constellations, motives and connected events so that a foreground can come to 
existence; and (iii) “Gestaltschliessungszwang”, ie. an obligation to fit parts 
into a larger whole that gives some form of closure to the story as a whole. 
These three narrative principles are a mixture of what a story is (or is supposed 
to be) and what it means to tell a story, ie. they follow from the structural 
features of stories and how to make a story plausible and intelligible to one’s 
audience. The argument is that a speaker needs to follow these principles, since 
otherwise he/she will not be narrating a story, but rather giving a ‘description’ 
or engaging in ‘argumentation’. In addition, the elicitation procedure of these 
stories is argued to follow four guidelines (see for details Schütze, 1977). First, 
the narrative interview requires a sufficient trust relationship between the 
interviewer and interviewee – again, so that participants actually narrate and 
not engage in accounting or other face-saving strategies. Second, the 
interviewer starts with a generative question to guarantee a spontaneous telling, 
without any previous thinking or strategizing by the interviewee (to engage in 
“extempore narrating”, as Schütze called it). Third, the “main narrative” 
(usually the life story) unfolds without interruptions from the interviewer, who 
basically engages in supporting the narrative flow; the aim here is to get “the 
story” from the perspective of the participant and to remove the situation as 
much as this is possible from the interview situation with its research agenda. 
Fourth, after the main narrative has been completed, interviewer and 
interviewee engage in an extended phase of questions and answers, first to 
flash out more aspects of the main story and from there moving into reflections 
and potential evaluations, eg. what the events may reveal about the speaker’s 
sense of self. 
 As I had mentioned above, the analysis of recorded and transcribed 
biographic interview data has been considerably advanced in the works of 
Fischer-Rosenthal and Rosenthal (Fischer-Rosenthal and Rosenthal, 1997; 
Rosenthal, 1995; this volume) and Wengraf and Chamberlayne 
(Chamberlayne, Bornat and Wengraf, 2000; Wengraf, 2006). Here I will 
briefly present the main components of how the biographic method is put to 
work with empirical data – again not attempting to give an overall account, but 
rather to ultimately be able to show how small stories can actually reorient 
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biographic methods to how they contribute to the larger picture of identity 
research by way of doing narrative analysis. 
 To summarize, the interpretive work with transcribed biographic interview 
data proceeds in a number of steps. It starts with the analysis of the “gelebte 
Lebensgeschichte” – which is actually a lot closer to Freeman’s categorical 
distinction of ‘life as it was lived’ (Freeman, in press) – as it is deducible from 
the transcript, and as it is supposed to have been formed in the participant’s 
socialization (Fischer-Rosenthal and Rosenthal, 1997, p.149). The analysis of 
this kind of more factual stuff is followed by a thematic and structural analysis 
of the text in order to get closer to how the interviewee actually has 
experienced this ‘lived life’ from his/her subjective point of view, which feeds 
into the third analytic step, consisting of a reconstruction of the particular case 
(“Rekonstruktion der Fallgeschichte”). Before the lived life and the storied life 
can be compared and contrasted, Fischer-Rosenthal and Rosenthal (1997, 
p.155) suggest to analyze particularly rich segments in more detail 
(“Feinanlyse”) so that a rich corpus of hypotheses can be built up to interpret 
which aspects of the interviewee’s life were actually told and which not, and 
how he or she tried to present him-/herself. Last but not least, in case a number 
of interviews with different interviewees on the same topic/problem area were 
conducted, the biography researcher can begin to compare the different 
analyzed biographies and generate a typology that is meant to illuminate the 
original research question for which an autobiographical interview had been 
chosen. 
 Wengraf (2006), in an interesting way, broadened and at the same time 
specified the purpose of eliciting and analyzing ‘Big Stories’: He expanded 
previous approaches into what he calls the “biographic-narrative interpretive 
method” (BNIM) to serve the function of dealing with life-histories, with lived 
situations, and with experience. In other words, what usually is differentiated 
into ‘life history interviews’ (as for instance in explorations of “becoming a 
psychologist” or “leaving home”), and ‘episodic interviews’ (as in Murray’s 
research on the experience of chronic pain, cf. Murray, 2003) can be tackled by 
the same interview elicitation technique and subsequent interpretive 
procedures. At the same time, Wengraf specifies that interview and the 
resulting transcripts are supposed to serve the main function to gain access to 
“two decision-making flows” (Wengraf, 2006, pp.34ff.), (i) the flow of 
decisions that were made to accomplish the “lived life”, and (ii) the flow of 
decisions that led to what surfaced in “the told story”. The analysis proceeds 
similarly to the analysis suggested by Fischer-Rosenthal and Rosenthal (1997) 
by first reconstructing the lived life and thereafter moving into the 
reconstruction of the told story. 
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So What’s Wrong with ‘Big Stories’? 
 
‘Big Stories’ are hardly everyday phenomena. They most often require 
elaborate elicitation techniques, precisely for the reason that they are not likely 
to be shared spontaneously. As I mentioned earlier, it requires particular kinds 
of institutional settings to bring them off, and, as we have seen more clearly, 
the use of highly specific rhetoric techniques. Thus, they are very rare; and one 
may also want to argue, somewhat artificial, phenomena.3 However, this per se 
does not make them less useful for the analysis of people and their identities 
than phenomena that are more ubiquitous, mundane and everyday. 
Nevertheless, it should already be noted that the search for ‘Big Stories’ as 
activities that only take place in quasi-experimental conditions makes them 
look suspiciously similar to traditional procedures that required to subject 
participants in research to very special conditions in order to look “behind” or 
“below” the surface into something that can not be seen in everyday, mundane 
circumstances; something “deeper” that then can be held responsible for – or 
may even “cause” – the “surface phenomena” of everyday actions and 
interactions. 
 Furthermore, the fact that we need to employ interview procedures, and in 
addition, interview techniques that require considerable training, brings up a 
second complication: There are at least three different traditions of research 
interviewing by use of which identities are currently theorized and 
investigated: (i) traditional ethnographic research, where interviews are 
supplements of partaking in the activities and sharing the life-world of the 
‘natives’; (ii) research in the broad terrain of clinical psychology, where 
interviews are considered to be “disclosures” of the inner world of the 
interviewee, granting entrance for the trained clinician into mind, soul or 
emotional interiors of the interviewee; and (iii) discursive approaches that treat 
interviews as practical sites where interviewees are managing accountability, 
linked to the actions and interactions between interviewer and interviewee, and 
all this as taking place within broader institutional and societal contexts. In 
spite of the fact that, as I have tried to show, a good deal of modern-day 
biographic research originated within the sociological traditions of the Chicago 
School and the framework established by Fritz Schütze (and developed further 
by Wolfram Fischer-Rosenthal and Gabriele Rosenthal and Tom Wengraf), the 
affinity to psychological clinical approaches is striking. Though again, this 
affinity should not be interpreted a priori as a problem. However, it opens up a 
larger set of assumptions that seem to guide the biographic approach and its 
fascination with ‘Big Stories’. 
 In a principled way, interpreters of ‘Big Stories’ are interested in what 
stories are ‘about’. Their main concern rests on what is revealed in these stories 
about the inner world of the interviewees, the way they lived their lives, what 
they went through and how they make sense of all this; and the language used 
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(in the form of stories) is the lead for the interpreter into this terrain. Now, 
again, in principle there is nothing wrong being interested in people and their 
experiences, if it wasn’t that language in the interpretive business of biography 
research was reduced to its referential (or at best ‘representative’) function. 
There are two questions that can be raised with regard to this issue: (i) Are 
there any other ways than construing the relationship between lives and “their 
stories” as lives that are “lived” and stories as about these lives? And (ii), what 
does it mean to give an account of one’s life in an interview situation? – Let 
me start with the latter. 
 
 
Accounting for ‘Life’? 
 
Stories are embedded in interaction. They are parts of interactional activities 
and locally accomplished projects, at least originally. This is the place where 
they are shared and come alive. They are occasioned by what is happening 
before and they are taken up on, at least often, in what is happening after they 
have been completed. Or, as Georgakopoulou puts it, “the sorts of identities 
that storytellers construct are intimately linked with the roles of the participants 
in the storytelling situation and their relationship with them. These premises 
force attention to the local interactional environment of the story, in the sense 
of prior and upcoming talk” (Georgakopoulou, 2005b, p.542). Usually, 
speakers bid for the floor to tell a story in order to ‘make a point’ (Labov and 
Waletzky, 1967/1997) and to ‘account’ for one’s own (and/or others’) social 
conduct as a matter of stake and interest (Potter, 1996), ie. making past actions 
accountable from a particular (moral) perspective for particular situated 
purposes. 
 
In the (interactional) circumstances in which we report our own or others’ 
conduct, our descriptions are themselves accountable phenomena through which 
we recognizably display an action’s (im)propriety, (in)correctness, (un)suitability, 
(in)appropriateness, (in)justices, (dis)honesty, and so forth. Insofar as descriptions 
are unavoidably incomplete and selective, they are designed for specific and local 
interactional purposes. Hence they may, always and irretrievably, be understood 
as doing moral work – as providing a basis for evaluating the “rightness” or 
“wrongness” of whatever is being reported. (Drew, 1998, p.295) 
 
Thus, the question may be asked: What is it that causes an ordinary person to 
account for his or her ‘life’ – and I don’t mean to give an account of a special 
situation in one’s life that may be constructed as particularly transforming and 
tellable, but one’s life as a ‘Big Story’? Again, I don’t want to be heard as 
dismissing ‘life stories’ or autobiographies as an impossible or completely 
artificial genre. However, in order for an ordinary person to give the account of 
one’s whole life, something must have happened that challenged the everyday 
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run of the mill, the ordinary course of one’s ‘life’, so that we turn away from 
what we usually do and arrest the moment in order to reflect on life and its 
meaning in a much more general way. Still, even in such extraordinary life-
challenging situations, we usually don’t go immediately and tell someone our 
whole life – unless this someone challenges us and explicitly asks for an 
account that lays out our complete lives. 
 So what I am trying to allude to is that interactional occasions that lead to 
longer stories and even potentially ‘Big Stories’ require someone to elicit them. 
More concretely, some of my past or present actions have led someone to ask 
me to give an account, ie. to lay out, explicate, clarify, and justify – and not 
just those situations or actions under debate; but instead my whole life – in as 
much completion as possible. And since this is most likely a very lengthy 
account, we can further speculate, that the person who elicited the account and 
now becomes the recipient, must really be interested in receiving this account. 
It must mean something: Not only is s/he willing to listen, but s/he also has to 
care about it. This kind of ‘contract’ must also hold the other way around: In 
order to be challenged into explicating how I have lived my life thus far, I need 
to want to comply, ie. I must have an interest in this person and trust that my 
account may be able to accomplish something more than small stories do. I 
only lay my life out, if something is at stake, as for instance if I have to fully 
explicate in order to save the relationship between the person who “asks for my 
life” and myself. However, we usually don’t role out our complete lives. 
Rather, we give an account of a few though important events that leads up to 
what needs to be accounted for. To dig into my whole life in order to explicate 
and make intelligible what happened seems to be quite a bit of interactive 
work, and the quantity of the interactive work is usually an indicator of the 
seriousness of the interactive challenge. In other words, if I had to start with 
my explication from birth on (or from my first childhood memory), I may be 
heard as evading the actual account and rather talk about ‘other’, less relevant, 
things. – I believe it is exactly this complex set of communicative assumptions 
that leads biography researchers to stress that trust is one of the most important 
aspects in eliciting good biographic data, and that a good deal of interviewing 
technique is oriented to establish a supportive atmosphere for the interviewee 
to ease this conversational burden. 
 The establishment of a trustworthy relationship between interviewer and 
interviewee and the continuous effort to elicit memories of concrete incidents 
(also called “particular incident narratives”, Wengraf, 2006) seem to be 
relevant for another, possibly more important, reason. Following Riemann 
(2003), the interviewer needs to be cautious not to invite accounts “which 
primarily aim at saving one’s face as self-justifications, excuses or ‘sad tales’ 
as Goffman (1968, p.141) referred to them” (Riemann, 2003, p.24), but 
narratives. Although it is possible to differentiate between ‘argumentation’ and 
‘narration’ on structural grounds, the goal to elicit narratives free of any 
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accounting for what was right and what was wrong with their life must strike 
the reader as odd. If it wasn’t for the opportunity of giving an account of one’s 
life along the lines outlined by Drew (above), why would anyone want to 
engage in telling their life story? However, behind the imperatives of 
establishing trust, not to interrupt the interviewee in their unfolding story, and 
only aim for “pure stories” are techniques that all seem to follow the 
assumption that people “have” a life and a life story that only comes out if the 
everyday conversational maxims are set aside and put out of action. This stirs 
up associations with clinical interviewing practices, where clients are 
encouraged to engage in self-disclosure, ie. uncover unconscious motives and 
allow to be seen what routinely has been kept secret. Viewed from this angle, 
the activity of telling ‘Big Stories’ appears to be tailored toward an ideal, 
where the interviewer disappears and interviewees talk to themselves, as if in a 
continuous monologue, disclosing one’s own life to oneself (see for a similar 
argument Benwell and Stokoe, 2006, p.142). 
 
 
Lived Lives and Told Stories? 
 
All proponents of ‘Big Stories’ vehemently claim that stories are NOT simple 
recalls and recounts of what once was or happened. And almost all of them 
also employ the construction metaphor when it comes to the relationship 
between telling stories and living lives. They argue that it is not just the 
narrative form that is constructed, but that the content of what is reported is 
also subject to the speaker’s construction; and that the symbolic means of 
language and socially circulating plots are the building blocks in this 
construction process. However, the ‘Big Story’ approaches to identity and lives 
seriously undertheorize and reduce language to its referential and ideational 
functions. They attempt to reconstruct the history of what had happened as the 
backdrop against which a story is formed and simultaneously want to establish 
‘story’ as the root metaphor for the person, our selves and identity. And while 
the attempt is made to maintain that it is the storied part that brings 
meaningfulness into histories of lived lives, ‘Big Story’ approaches have to 
constantly worry about the correctness of what is (re)counted and the 
distortions – deliberate or not.  
 One way to move out of this dilemma is to foreground the action 
orientation or discursive function that is inherent to all language use, and make 
this orientation the starting point for narrative analysis. I already have tried to 
allude to the potential problems that reside in the neglect of the accounting 
function that stories have in interaction. If the elicitation techniques used to 
tease out ‘Big Stories’ are meant to set off the procedures of everyday 
accounting, these approaches, and with them any elicited ‘Big Story’, not only 
run danger to appear artificial but also distrustful in terms of getting anything 
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‘real’. If proponents of ‘Big Stories’ believe that they can uncover anything 
more authentic or more “deep seated” than what is negotiated in everyday 
small stories, I think we need to watch out and seriously ask what this ‘more’ 
or ‘deeper’ could be. 
 This is not the time and place to discuss the role of the interview in social 
science research (see the recent debate between Potter and Hepburn and Smith, 
Hollway, and Mishler in Qualitative Research in Psychology, 2005). However, 
as long as interviews are used as the method par excellence to collect and 
analyze “how people represent their experiences and understandings of events 
and aspects of their worlds” (Mishler, 2005, p.318), without analyzing how 
these “representations” are actually put to use in particular contexts in order to 
accomplish interactive business, “peoples’ lives” are running danger to get 
prematurely ‘fixed’ and potentially reified or essentialized. In our own studies 
of small stories (Bamberg, 2004a, b, c; Georgakopoulou, 2004, 2005a, 2006; 
Moissinac and Bamberg, 2005) we could demonstrate that there is a strong 
tendency to strategically avoid fixity, or at least to entertain different, often 
contradictory, positions that are held simultaneously. This tendency to embrace 
and simultaneously resist identities has become a pervasive feature staring the 
researcher right in the eye when analyzing small stories. Now, this is not to say 
that this pervasive tendency is washed out in interview situations that are 
supposed to elicit ‘Big Stories’ or in interviews in general. However, the 
treatment of ‘Big Stories’ as an underlying competence that is grounded in 
human existence with the ‘execution’ of small stories as colored by 
performance issues gives grounds to become skeptical vis-à-vis the biographic-
narrative method. In contrast, to start from the analysis of small stories in 
interactions, including interview interactions, it is very well possible to see 
how the practices become refined in ways that can be released and brought off 
in special kinds of interview settings by use of special kinds of interview 
techniques. 
 To sum up, although it was not my aim to dismiss or do away with ‘Big 
Stories’ and their analyses in identity research, I nevertheless have tried to 
critically review their currency in contemporary narrative research. In my 
opinion, narrative analysis that is interested in the nexus between the stories we 
tell and who we are has to do more than listen to what is said (De Fina, 
Schiffrin and Bamberg, 2006). A reorientation of narrative studies toward a 
discursive approach has the potential to “provide an overarching theoretical 
coherence to a systematic turn to narratives-in-interaction at the same time as 
affording opportunities for much needed inter-disciplinarities for the future of 
narrative analysis” (Georgakopoulou, 2006, p.284). In the long run, this only 
will strengthen the investigation into ‘Big Stories’, rather than weakening. 
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Endnotes 
 
1. The term ‘Big Stories’ was chosen over ‘Grand Stories’ in order to avoid 
the possibly confusing allusion to ‘Grand Narratives’ as coined by Lyotard. 
While ‘Grand Narrative’ or ‘Grand Récit’ refers to more global 
explanatory meta or master narratives (cf. Bamberg, 2004b, 2005), the 
term ‘Grand Story’ would have nicely captured the ‘grandiosing tendency’ 
of self presentations as something that is more paradigmatic to life stories, 
life writing, and autobiographies. However, people tend to do this in small 
stories, too. So, ‘big’ versus ‘small’ is probably the most neutral 
opposition. 
 
2 This is how Bruner sees ‘the social and the personal’ (while others refer to 
it as ‘the general and the specific’ or ‘the objective and the subjective’) as 
always related and coupled and ultimately inseparable from each other (see 
also Fish, 1980). 
 
3. Even topics such as ‘chronic illness’, ‘emigration’ or ‘divorce’, although 
often narrated in the form of giving the phenomena under discussion a 
temporal contour, ie. a history or genealogy, are very rarely told as part of 
the larger life history of the speaker. 
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